@misc{Lexikon der Argumente,
title = {Quotation from: Lexikon der Argumente – Begriffe - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Armstrong,David M.},
subject = {Situationssemantik},
note = {Place I 27
Situationssemantik/Barwise/Perry: "Situation": extralinguistisches Gegenstück zum Satz. Danach hängt die linguistische Repräsentation des extralinguistischen von einer Korrespondenz zwischen der Ontologie und der Satzstruktur ab. ((s)Vgl. >Abbildtheorie.)},
note = {David M. Armstrong
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’s and Armstrong’s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996
Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 },
file = {http://philosophie-wissenschaft-kontroversen.de/details.php?id=268176}
url = {http://philosophie-wissenschaft-kontroversen.de/details.php?id=268176}
}